Adut Salva Kiir Mayardit, the daughter of South Sudanese President Salva Kiir Mayardit, has been linked through investigative reports and whistleblower accounts to the network surrounding Crawford Capital, a private company accused of controlling important government revenue collection systems in South Sudan.

Crawford Capital became involved in the collection of taxes, licence fees, visa payments, health certificate charges, import-related payments and oil-sector permits through electronic platforms operated for government institutions.

The company’s expansion across several government departments placed it at the centre of payments made by businesses, travellers, oil companies, importers, humanitarian organisations and other parties requiring services or approvals from the South Sudanese government.

Investigations into Crawford Capital later moved beyond the company’s registered shareholders and focused on politically connected individuals accused of supporting, protecting or benefiting from its government contracts.

Adut Salva Kiir’s name appeared in reports examining the political network surrounding the company, although she was not publicly listed as a direct shareholder in Crawford Capital.

The reports placed her close to individuals involved in Crawford Capital and described her as part of the political structure surrounding the company’s operations within the government.

Adut Salva Kiir’s position inside the presidency

Adut Salva Kiir Mayardit is one of President Salva Kiir’s daughters and has held a public role as Senior Presidential Envoy for Special Programmes.

Her position placed her within the presidential administration while Crawford Capital was expanding its control over electronic payment and revenue collection services across South Sudan.

She has also appeared in public and business reporting involving members of the President’s family, government programmes and commercial interests connected to politically influential individuals.

Investigative reports examining Crawford Capital placed Adut among figures whose names appeared around the company’s political and commercial network.

The reports described her as a politically influential person connected to individuals managing Crawford Capital’s operations, including majority shareholder and company executive Garang Mayom Kuoc Malek.

Crawford Capital’s entry into government revenue collection

Crawford Capital entered South Sudan’s public sector as a digital technology and electronic payment service provider.

The company operated through Crawford Capital, Capital Pay, Crawford Laboratory and other connected entities involved in government service delivery and payment processing.

Its platforms were used to process money collected through electronic taxation, business registration, licensing, immigration services, health certification, import procedures and oil-sector activities.

The company was not limited to supplying software because its systems also handled payments made by businesses and individuals before the money was transferred to government accounts.

Investigators reported that Crawford Capital became deeply involved in the collection and management of non-oil government revenue.

This gave the company access to transaction records, payment volumes, service charges and funds collected through compulsory government services.

The arrangement placed Crawford inside systems that were previously managed directly by government departments.

The reported 75 percent profit share

One of the most controversial contracts connected to Crawford Capital was a reported 2019 arrangement that allowed the company to receive 75 percent of profits generated through some services operated using its systems.

The South Sudanese government reportedly received the remaining 25 percent.

The money covered payments made through public services, including licences, permits, taxes and administrative charges.

The contract attracted scrutiny because the company received the larger portion of profits generated through services created, regulated and enforced by the government.

Details concerning the approval process, the government officials involved and the calculations used to determine Crawford Capital’s share were not fully published.

The arrangement became central to investigations into whether private companies were receiving excessive portions of government revenue before money entered official treasury accounts.

Millions earned from tax systems

Investigators estimated that Crawford Capital earned more than $5 million annually from electronic tax collection services.

The company processed taxes and other payments collected from businesses operating within South Sudan.

The electronic systems were promoted as a way of reducing cash transactions and improving government revenue collection.

Questions later emerged over the total amounts processed, the deductions made by Crawford Capital and the amounts finally deposited into public accounts.

Investigators reported that some of the revenue collected through privately managed systems was not clearly reflected in South Sudan’s official budget.

The absence of complete transaction records made it difficult to independently determine the exact amount collected across all Crawford-linked platforms.

Oil permits and petroleum payments

Crawford Capital also entered the petroleum sector, which remains South Sudan’s main source of national revenue.

The company reportedly processed oil-related permits and payments linked to companies involved in extraction, transportation and export activities.

Investigators estimated that Crawford Capital earned as much as $11.5 million annually from oil permit fees.

The company’s role placed it inside one of South Sudan’s most financially important industries.

Crawford’s systems were reportedly used by petroleum companies requiring permits and approvals from government institutions.

The company was also linked to equipment and operations deployed at oil depots within South Sudan.

Court proceedings filed in Kenya later referred to Crawford Capital as a service provider involved in operations connected to oil facilities and South Sudanese government institutions.

The Kenyan shareholder

Kenyan businessman Jeremy Gisemba was identified as one of Crawford Capital’s major shareholders.

He was reported to hold approximately 26 percent of Crawford Capital and more than 23 percent of Capital Pay.

His ownership connected Kenya directly to the company’s government contracts and revenue collection activities in South Sudan.

Gisemba’s reported stake placed him behind Garang Mayom Kuoc Malek, who was identified as the company’s majority shareholder.

Crawford Capital later appeared in Kenyan court proceedings involving equipment linked to operations at South Sudanese oil depots.

The proceedings involved claims connected to Kennedy Omondi Ogelo, the Kenya Pipeline Company and the Kenya Revenue Authority.

The Kenyan court records showed that Crawford Capital’s operations extended beyond online payment processing and included equipment linked to oil-sector facilities.

Garang Mayom’s control of the company

Garang Mayom Kuoc Malek was identified as the majority shareholder and one of the most important figures inside Crawford Capital.

He was reported to own approximately 68 percent of Crawford Capital, 95 percent of Crawford Laboratory and more than 60 percent of Capital Pay.

Garang Mayom was also identified as the son of a former South Sudanese deputy minister and parliamentarian.

His political family background became part of the investigation into how Crawford Capital obtained access to multiple government systems.

Investigative reports linked Garang Mayom to individuals close to the presidency, including members of President Salva Kiir’s family.

His name appeared alongside Adut Salva Kiir in reporting examining the people connected to Crawford Capital’s political protection and government contracts.

Ruey Majok Guandong and the original ownership

Ruey Majok Guandong was reported to have owned 50 percent of Crawford Capital when the company was first incorporated.

His ownership changed after later restructuring of the company.

Ruey Guandong was identified as the son of South Sudan’s ambassador to Türkiye.

Investigators also reported that Ruey Guandong and Garang Mayom had previously formed another company with Mayar Salva Kiir, one of President Salva Kiir’s sons.

That earlier business relationship connected Crawford Capital’s main figures to another member of the presidential family.

The relationship became part of wider investigations into overlapping companies, family connections and government contracts involving individuals close to the presidency.

Adut Salva Kiir and the Crawford network

Adut Salva Kiir was not publicly listed among Crawford Capital’s formal shareholders.

Her name instead appeared in investigative reports and network charts examining political figures connected to the company’s operations.

The reports placed her above or close to executives involved in Crawford Capital and Capital Pay.

They also described her as a person whose political position and family connections placed her within the network surrounding the company.

The reports linked her to Garang Mayom and other individuals involved in Crawford’s government business.

Her name was also raised by people investigating the ownership, protection and beneficiaries of the company’s revenue collection contracts.

The available public records did not show a direct shareholding registered in her name.

The connection was based on reported relationships, political influence, whistleblower information and business networks involving the President’s family.

The whistleblower who discussed Crawford Capital

South Sudanese businessman Gaddhaffy Athorbey Guiet Chuit became an important figure in investigations into Crawford Capital.

He reportedly shared information with journalists, activists and researchers examining the company’s ownership, contracts and government payment systems.

His information concerned Crawford Capital, Capital Pay and the collection of public revenue through electronic platforms.

He was also reported to have discussed people connected to the company, including Garang Mayom and members of President Salva Kiir’s family.

Reports stated that Gaddhaffy identified powerful individuals who should be examined if anything happened to him.

Adut Salva Kiir’s name appeared in reporting about the warnings and information he shared before his disappearance.

The Nairobi abduction

Gaddhaffy was reportedly abducted in Nairobi in June 2026.

Accounts of the incident stated that armed and masked men intercepted him while he was travelling in a taxi.

He had reportedly received warnings concerning threats to his safety before he disappeared.

His family later said he had been transported from Kenya to South Sudan.

He was reported to have been detained at the Giyada military intelligence facility in Juba.

No public court record showed that he was extradited from Kenya through a formal legal process.

There was also no publicly disclosed arrest warrant or Kenyan judicial order authorising his transfer to South Sudan.

The reported movement from Nairobi to a military detention facility in Juba turned the Crawford Capital investigation into a cross-border security matter involving Kenya and South Sudan.

No public evidence has directly connected Adut Salva Kiir or Crawford Capital to the physical operation that removed Gaddhaffy from Nairobi.

The connection between the abduction and the Crawford Capital scandal came from the information he was reportedly sharing before his disappearance.

Crawford Capital’s health-sector contracts

Crawford-linked companies also entered South Sudan’s health payment systems during the Covid-19 pandemic.

The company reportedly managed a system under which people paid for Covid-19 testing certificates.

Approximately $6 was reportedly charged for each certificate processed through the platform.

Questions later emerged over the number of certificates issued, the total amount collected and the final distribution of the money.

Crawford later received another contract connected to Ebola preparedness.

The company was reportedly paid $10 million in advance in 2022 for work linked to the programme.

The payment was large compared with South Sudan’s reported annual health-sector expenditure.

Public information concerning equipment supplied, services completed and final accounting for the advance payment remained limited.

The health contracts added another government sector to Crawford Capital’s growing portfolio.

Crawford’s expansion into immigration and trade

Crawford-linked platforms were also used to process electronic visas and other immigration-related payments.

Travellers seeking permission to enter South Sudan were required to use systems connected to the company.

The company’s technology was also used in business registration, trade licensing and import procedures.

This placed Crawford inside payments involving local companies, foreign investors, humanitarian agencies and international organisations operating in South Sudan.

The wider the company expanded, the more government revenue passed through systems controlled or managed by Crawford-linked entities.

Investigators later examined whether the government had full access to the transaction data generated by those systems.

Overflight fees

Crawford Capital was also reported to have pursued control over international aircraft overflight fees.

These fees are paid by airlines and aircraft operators using a country’s airspace.

The South Sudanese overflight fee system was estimated to generate millions of dollars every month.

Control over that revenue stream would have expanded Crawford Capital’s role beyond taxes, visas, health payments and oil permits.

Reports indicated that the company was continuing to seek additional government revenue collection contracts while questions about its existing operations were already increasing.

The attempted suspension

In March 2026, South Sudan’s Minister of Trade and Industry, Atong Kuol Manyang Juuk, ordered Crawford Capital’s digital payment and electronic services suspended for 90 days.

The suspension was intended to allow an administrative and technical review of the company’s systems.

The review was expected to examine Crawford’s role in public payments, its technical operations and the government’s control over the platforms.

Vice President James Wani Igga later intervened and reversed the suspension.

Crawford Capital continued operating after the decision was overturned.

The trade minister was later removed from office.

The reversal became part of reports examining political protection surrounding the company.

Senior government officials continued to defend Crawford’s systems as part of the country’s electronic payment and digital revenue collection programme.

Government support for Crawford

Government officials described Crawford Capital’s platforms as systems intended to modernise public services and reduce cash payments.

The company continued operating in several ministries and government institutions despite growing international scrutiny.

Officials defended the company after questions were raised about its contracts, revenue-sharing arrangements and control over payment infrastructure.

The government’s support allowed Crawford to retain its position within public revenue collection systems.

The company’s operations continued while investigators examined the amount of money it collected, the deductions it retained and the amounts transferred to official accounts.

Revenue missing from official accounts

Investigators reported gaps between revenue expected from government services and money reflected in South Sudan’s official budget.

The lack of complete transaction data made it difficult to determine how much money passed through Crawford-controlled systems.

The company’s service charges, profit shares and other deductions were not fully disclosed in publicly available records.

The payments involved businesses, oil companies, travellers, importers and organisations required to obtain government approvals.

Questions also remained over whether ministries could independently verify transaction volumes processed through the private platforms.

The revenue concerns became one of the main reasons Crawford Capital attracted international scrutiny.

The presidential family connections

The Crawford Capital network contained several links to President Salva Kiir’s family.

Adut Salva Kiir was linked through political and investigative reporting examining the company’s protection and ownership network.

Mayar Salva Kiir, the President’s son, was reported to have previously formed a company with Crawford figures Garang Mayom and Ruey Majok Guandong.

The connections placed members of the presidential family within the wider business network surrounding Crawford Capital.

The registered ownership records did not list Adut or Mayar as direct Crawford Capital shareholders.

Their connection came through previous business relationships, political roles and reported links to people controlling the company.

The overlap between company shareholders, politically connected families and government contracts became a major part of the scandal.

The Crawford Capital network

The Crawford Capital scandal involves several connected entities and individuals operating across technology, health, taxation, oil, immigration and trade.

Crawford Capital served as the main company associated with government contracts.

Capital Pay operated electronic payment systems used to collect public fees.

Crawford Laboratory became involved in health services and certificate processing.

Garang Mayom held controlling interests across several of the entities.

Jeremy Gisemba held major stakes in Crawford Capital and Capital Pay.

Ruey Majok Guandong appeared in the original ownership structure and previous business ventures linked to the President’s son.

Adut Salva Kiir appeared in investigations examining political support and influence surrounding the companies.

The network expanded while Crawford Capital continued receiving access to government revenue collection systems.

The central facts in the scandal

Crawford Capital gained control over several systems used to collect South Sudanese government revenue.

The company reportedly received a 75 percent share of profits from some services while the government received 25 percent.

Investigators estimated that it earned more than $5 million annually from electronic tax systems and as much as $11.5 million annually from oil permits.

A Crawford-linked company reportedly received a $10 million advance payment for an Ebola preparedness contract.

The company expanded into visas, health certificates, business licences, trade procedures and petroleum payments.

Its shareholders included politically connected South Sudanese individuals and Kenyan businessman Jeremy Gisemba.

Individuals controlling Crawford Capital had previous business links to Mayar Salva Kiir, the President’s son.

Adut Salva Kiir’s name appeared in reports examining political influence and protection surrounding the company.

A whistleblower sharing information about Crawford Capital was abducted in Nairobi and later reported to be detained in a South Sudanese military intelligence facility.

The company continued operating after a ministerial order suspending its services was reversed by South Sudan’s Vice President.

These events placed members of President Salva Kiir’s family, senior government officials, South Sudanese business figures and a Kenyan shareholder inside the wider network surrounding Crawford Capital’s government contracts and revenue collection operations.